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REGARDING RIGHTS:
AN ESSAY HONORING
THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS

by Tracy E. Higgins*

I. INTRODUCTION

The half-century since the drafting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights' has been famously heralded as the "Age of Rights" and the
concept of human rights described as "the only political-moral idea that has
gained universal acceptance."' During the same period, however, both terms
defining the subject-human and rights-have become increasingly
contested. Informed by the emergence of identity-based political movements,
critics have attacked the category human has as bearing the baggage of
Western Enlightenment assumptions about personhood and community,
inherently racist, sexist, and classist.3 Theorists across the political spectrum
have criticized the concept of rights as indeterminate, destructive of political

*
Associate Professor, Fordham Law School; J.D., Harvard (1990); A.B., Princeton
(1986). I would like to thank David Nachman, Chair of the International Human Rights
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the members of that
committee who organized the conference of which this paper was a part. I would also like
to thank Rubi Teitel for organizing the panel on the theory of human rights and my colleague,
Martin Flaherty, for his helpful comments and his support of human rights work at Fordham
Law School. I am grateful to the participants in the Cornell Law School Faculty Workshop
where I presented a draft of this article and received many thoughtful comments and
suggestions.
1.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2.
See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights ix (1990) (declaring that "[o]urs is the age
of rights.").
3.
See Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations,in Feminists Theorize the Political 8,
8-10 (Judith Butler & Joan Scott eds., 1992) (discussing the ethnocentrism of the universal
and the human subject).
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community and even threatening to moral values.4 In light of these
developments, it seems appropriate not so much to celebrate the survival of
the Universal Declaration and its progeny but to consider the significance of
that survival for the meaning of human rights in an increasingly fragmented
world. This article speaks to this theme by considering the Universal
Declaration and the human rights framework it established in light of various
rights-based and identity-based critiques.
I confess that, as a feminist, I am sympathetic to many of the
critiques that have emerged from identity politics.5 Moreover, I am skeptical
of the ability of a framework of liberal rights to safeguard many of the
important human needs underlying international human rights instruments.6
At the same time, as a human rights lawyer, I am committed to the principles
embodied in the Universal Declaration and to the existence of a standard
which permits cross-cultural human rights activism and legal remedy. Thus,
in this Article, I attempt to explore some of the challenges presented by both
the politics of difference and the various critiques of rights to the Universal
Declaration and suggest ways that those challenges might be met without
undermining the power of that document as a yardstick of human integrity.
In Part II, I first summarize briefly several characteristics and critiques of
rights discourse. I then consider the relevance of these critiques to the
discourse of international human rights and argue that human rights
discourse is less vulnerable to certain of these critiques than is rights
discourse generally. Part III elaborates a second importani challenge to the
concept of human rights, the emergence of identity politics. Part IV
integrates these two themes by suggesting ways in which a shared discourse
of rights may bridge cultural differences and build political community and,
at the same time, systematic attention to cultural contingency may address
some of the weaknesses of that discourse.
4.
See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse
109 (1991 ) (rights as destructive of moral values); Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent:
America In Search of A Public Philosophy (1996) (liberal rights as destructive of political
discourse); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984) (arguing that
rights are indeterminate).
5.
See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19
Harv. Women's L.J. 89 (1996) (discussing the relationship between cultural claims and
feminist anti-essentialist commitments).
6.
See, e.g. Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1657,
1694-97 (1997) (linking feminist arguments concerning agency to liberal assumptions
regarding political participation and social contract).
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE LIMITATIONS OF RIGHTS DISCOURSE

A.

Critiques of Rights

In the five decades since the drafting of the Universal Declaration,
the language of rights has become an increasingly central feature of political
discourse.7 The most common political response to hunger, homelessness,
illiteracy, or poverty has been to seek (or grant) legal rights to food, shelter,
education, or public support.8 As a result, important human concerns have
been increasingly translated into legal rights rather than articulated
politically as needs or interests.9
The turn to rights represents not simply a political expression of an
obligation on the part of society to meet basic human needs but also the
pragmatic belief that defining those needs as legal rights makes it more likely
that they will be met.'" This faith in rights stems, at least in part, from the
power of rights in liberal theory to function as trumps, to borrow Ronald
Dworkin's famous characterization." Dworkin explains that "[i]ndividuals
have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient
justification for denying what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do."' 2
In theory, then, the recognition of a right stops political debate, removing the
claim from the political process. At the point at which the right is
recognized, the political question is apparently resolved, and the need is met.
Of course, rights do not really function in this way. The translation
of needs into rights, even if judicially enforceable, simply defers and
individualizes the struggles to satisfy those needs. Thus, even as the
trumping power of rights has helped to fuel the widespread expansion of
rights discourse, disenchantment with that discourse has long since set in.
Critics on the political left have argued that, although rights function as
7.
See Louis Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights as 'Rights' I Cardozo L. Rev. 35,
427 (1979).
8.
See Irwin Cotler, Human Rights as the Modern Tool of Revolution, in Human
Rights in the Twenty-First Century 7 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
9.
The best example of this trend may be the new South Africa. For an interesting
analysis of the South African experiment with "human rights statehood," see Makau wa
Mutua, Hope and Despairfor a New South Africa: The Limits of RightsDiscourse, 10 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 63 (1997).
10.
See Henkin, supra note 7, at 265.
11.
See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously xi (1989).
12.
Id.
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trumps in the political process, this function often leaves human needs not
merely uncontested but unrealized.' 3 These critics insist that our liberal
rights regime has largely failed to deliver on its apparent promise to meet the
basic human needs characterized as rights. 4 The particular explanations for
this failure vary. Critical Legal scholars have focused on the indeterminacy
of rights. For example, Mark Tushnet has argued that "[o]nce one identifies
what counts as a right in a specific setting, it invariably turns out that the
right is unstable," thereby undercutting the power of the claim of right to
protect the individual.' 5 This indeterminacy is rooted in part in the balancing
of interests implicit in the decision whether to recognize a right in a given
context, 6 a problem that is particularly acute when rights are in conflict and
must be balanced against each other.' 7 Nothing in our rights framework
constrains this determination, leaving the recognition or denial of rights to
politics while simultaneously masking this political aspect.'

13.
This literature is voluminous and extends at least as far back as Marx's argument
that the Enlightenment's conception of rights abstracts from, and therefore ignores, concrete
human suffering in favor of ideal equality and freedom. See Karl Marx, On the Jewish
Question, in Karl Marx, Early Writings 233 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans.,
1975).
14.
Some well-known examples of such arguments include Alan Freeman, Racism,
Rights, and the Questfor Equalityof Opportunity: A CriticalEssay, 23 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 295, 331 (1988); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the
Pactof the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984); Martha Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 Yale L.J. 1860 (1987); Frances Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critiqueof Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387 (1984); Tushnet, supra
note 4; Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdeals From Deconstructed
Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401 (1987).
15.
Tushnet, supra note 4.
16.
See id. at 1371-72.
17.
See id. at 1373.
18.
Wendy Brown explains the problem as follows:
The question of the liberatory or egalitarian force of rights is always
historically and culturally circumscribed; rights have no inherent
political semiotic, no innate capacity either to advance or impede radical
democratic ideals. Yet rights necessarily operate in and as an ahistorical,
acultural, acontextual idiom: they claim distance from specific political
contexts and historical vicissitudes, and they necessarily participate in
a discourse of enduring universality rather than provisionality or
partiality.
Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity 97 (1995).
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Feminists have also offered critiques of rights, often focusing on the
emphasis of liberal rights on state power. According to the feminist critique,
by constraining the scope of state but not private power, liberal rights not
only ignore an important threat to women's well-being, but may undermine
the ability of the state to remedy gender inequality in the private sphere. 9
Feminists have also criticized the assumption of autonomy underlying liberal
rights, noting that recognition of these rights presupposes the capacity of the
individual to exercise them meaningfully, an assumption that may be less
valid for some groups than for others.20 By ignoring this preexisting equality,
liberal rights regimes have not only failed to end gender-based oppression
but have, in some cases, preserved the prerogatives of male power."
Critical Race scholars have been somewhat more reluctant to
relinquish the discourse of rights altogether. For example, Patricia Williams
has noted that "[r]ights imply a respect that places one in the referential
range of self and others, that elevate one's status from human body to social
being."' Nevertheless, these scholars have effectively exposed the ways in
which liberal rights tend to preserve racial privilege, notwithstanding
guarantees of equality.23 In the United States, this conservative power of
rights is perhaps most evident in the Supreme Court's voting rights and
affirmative action jurisprudence in which the Court has used the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection to strike down measures
designed to ameliorate racial inequality.24
According to many of these radical critics, the problem with rights
discourse is not limited to its failure to meet human needs through the
19.
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law 42 (1988) (arguing that "[i]f differentiation into classifications, in itself, is
discrimination . . . the use of law to change group-based social inequalities becomes
problematic, even contradictory").

I have argued elsewhere that "[t]he critical problem with overstating the agency
20.
of the individual is not that human nature is misdescribed but that the political consequences
of that misdescription are visited unequally on different groups." Higgins, supra note 6, at
1696.
21.
See Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law 144-46 (1989) (discussing ways
inwhich rights designed to protect the individual from the state may be used by individuals
against other, less powerful, individuals).
22.
Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 153 (1991).
23.
See Freeman, supra note 14, at 331.
24.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995)
(applying strict scrutiny to benign classifications benefitting historically oppressed groups);
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,494 (1989) (Opinion of O'Connor, J.)
(same).
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creation of legal claims. The problem also lies with the way rights discourse
frustrates the effort to meet those needs through the political process.25 An
emphasis on rights elevates the legal over the political, thereby undercutting
political solidarity around an issue by translating the denial of political
claims into individualized harm.26 Defining needs as rights may also create
a dependence upon courts and lawyers that is particularly problematic where
access to such resources is quite limited. 7
Other critics of rights, more often politically moderate or
conservative, have focused not so much on thefailure of rights discourse to
meet the human needs it describes, but its effect on the political process even
when rights claims succeed. For example, Mary Ann Glendon criticizes
rights discourse as obscuring questions of responsibility and duty. She
argues that rights discourse "disserves public deliberation not only through
affirmatively promoting an image of the rights-bearer as a radically
autonomous individual, but through its corresponding neglect of the social

25.
See Gabel, supra note 14 at 1588-90 (describing the role of rights in rising
political movements and the threat that a rights victory can subdue the transformative
potential of such movements).
See id. at 1591 (discussing the strategy of state containment of social movements
26.
through the selective recognition of rights claims); see also Mary Becker, ConservativeFree
Speech and the Uneasy Casefor JudicialReview, 64 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 975, 996-98

(1993) (discussing ways in which ineffective judicial victories can weaken a social
movement by lessening grassroots pressure for change and mobilizing opposition).
See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
27.
(1991). This problem is well-illustrated by the post-apartheid constitutional regime in South
Africa. Influenced by Western liberal constitutionalism, the South African constitution
translates many of the most important needs of its people into rights language. It has been
heralded as one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. Nevertheless the ability
of citizens to assert rights-based claims is limited by a lack of resources. In 1995, for
approximately twenty-six million South Africans, there were approximately nine thousand
practicing lawyers. Note, Legal Representation ForIndigent CriminalDefendants in South
Africa: PossibilitiesUnder The 1994 Constitution, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L.425, 448

(Spring 1995). Given the lack of resources both to litigate and to remedy deprivations of
such rights, this rights language may ultimately contribute to political instability rather than
freedom. See Sharon Meadows, Implementing The Right to Counsel in Post-apartheidSouth

Africa, 29 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 453 (1995) (examining the problems associated
with providing legal services to the poor in South Africa); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From
Mandela to Mthwana: ProvidingCounsel to The UnrepresentedAccused in South Africa,

75 B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1995) (discussing lack of access to counsel in the criminal context).
Glendon, supra note 4, at 12-14.
28.
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dimensions of personhood."29 From a somewhat different perspective,
Michael Sandel emphasizes the problematic neutrality of a liberal rights
regime and argues that liberalism, characterized by a framework of rights
and negative liberties, has impoverished public debate about important
political questions." Each contemplates an alternative public discourse that
is enriched by collective deliberation over important moral issues and
common values rather than assertions of rights claims by atomistic, selfregarding individuals.
B.

International Human Rights and Rights Critiques

Rights discourse can and has been defended vigorously against these
critiques." If, however, one assumes their validity as to rights discourse
generally, how does the particular discourse of international human rights
fare in the face of such critiques? In this section, I argue that in many
respects our international human rights framework, informed as it is by
Western liberalism, is quite vulnerable to many of the radical critiques
presented by critical legal scholars, feminists, and critical race theorists. On
the level of discourse, or "rights talk," however, it is less vulnerable to the
communitarian critiques of scholars such as Glendon and Sandel.
As the current framework of international human rights derives
much of its content from Western liberalism, it suffers from many of the
weaknesses highlighted by the radical critics of rights. Indeed, those
weaknesses may be more evident in international human rights guarantees.
For example, the balancing of interests that contributes to the indeterminacy
of rights on the national level is even more problematic on the international
level where states are permitted expressly to derogate from their obligations
Id. at 109; see also Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights,
29.
Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda 161 (1993); William A. Galston, Liberal
Purposes (1991); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982); The
Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, 2 Responsive

Community, Winter 1991-1992, at 18-20.
30.
See Sandel, supranote 4, at 322 (criticizing procedural liberalism and warning that
"[a] politics that brackets morality and religion too completely soon generates its own
disenchantment.").
31.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Foundationsof LiberalEquality, in Equal Freedom;
Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values I (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995); Will Kymlicka,
Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989); Liberalism and the Moral Life (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 1989); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (1990); John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993); Linda C. McClain, Rights and
Irresponsibility,43 Duke L.J. 989 (1994).
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based on domestic political considerations. Moreover, the problem of
balancing conflicting rights seems to emerge more frequently on the
international level where economic and cultural rights, though themselves
virtually unenforceable, are invoked as a counterpoint to claims of civil and
political rights.
The international human rights framework is also quite vulnerable
to feminist criticism that its rights guarantees overemphasize state action and
ignore private power. For example, feminists have criticized the
traditional focus in international law on political and civil rights,
particularly negative rights against the state, as reflecting the view that the
greatest threat to the life and liberty of the individual is the state.32 According
to many, that view does not adequately reflect the realities of women's
lives.33 For women, the private exercise of male power more often threatens
their lives and liberty. 4 This exercise of power includes all forms of private
discrimination whether it takes place in the workplace, in religious
institutions, or in the family. It also includes all forms of gender-based
violence including sexual harassment and domestic violence.35 These private
forms of power are often reinforced by the state, though they are not easily
characterized as abuses of state power in the traditional sense.36 According
to this critique, by emphasizing limits on state power, the traditional human

32.
See Women in International Law Interest Group of the American Society of
International Law, Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law 93-170 (Dorinda
G. Dallmeyer, ed., 1993); Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibilityfor Violations of Women's
Human Rights, 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 125 (1994); Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A
Feminist Critiqueofthe PublicPrivateDistinction in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 6
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 87 (1993).
33.
See, e.g., Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist
Perspective, in Women's Rights/Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives II
(Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995); Hilary Charlesworth et al., FeministApproaches
to InternationalLaw, 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 613, 634-35 (1991).
34.
This is not to suggest that women are not also the victims of traditional human
rights violations. Women are imprisoned, tortured, raped, killed, and silenced by state
authorities just as men are. Feminist human rights advocates simply argue that abuses are

more often perpetrated against women by their own spouses, lovers, and families.
35.
In recent years, violence against women has become a priority among advocates
for women's rights on the international level, most recently at the Fourth United Nations
World Conference on Women in Beijing. See Rhonda Copelon, BringingBeijing Home, 21
Brook. J. Int'l L. 599 (1996); Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights:
A Reconceptualizationof Violencefor the Twenty-First Century, 60 AIb. L. Rev. 607 (1997).
36.
See Bunch, supra note 33, at 13-14.
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rights framework understates the need for state intervention to limit abuses
of private power even while reinforcing traditional sources of such power. 7
Notwithstanding these limitations of the human rights regime, it is
also in some respects less vulnerable to certain rights critiques than is rights
discourse generally. Important aspects of the radical rights critique and much
of the communitarian critique emphasize rights discourse or "rights talk"
rather than the more specific legal operation of rights." Indeed, radical
critics and communitarians offer surprisingly similar arguments concerning
the negative effects of rights talk on political discourse.39 With respect to
these arguments, human rights discourse is better able to withstand criticism
than is rights talk more generally.
Popularly understood, human rights are those rights possessed by all
persons equally by virtue of their status as human beings. This very general
definition of human rights leaves much open to debate,' not least of which
is the philosophical basis for human rights. Philosophers and political
theorists have offered justifications for the existence of human rights ranging
from positivism4 ' to utilitarianism42 to social contract theory 43 to natural
37.
Id.
38.
See, Glendon, supra note 4, at 15 (characterizing her critique as aimed at the
rhetoric of rights rather than at specific rights or the idea of rights in general).
39.
Compare Gabel, supra note 14, at 1588-90 (describing the disabling impact of
rights on political movements), with Glendon, supra note 4, at 109-10 (describing the
disabling impact of rights discourse on public deliberation), and Sandel, supra note 4, at
321-24 (attributing similar consequences to a commitment to procedural liberalism).
40.
Philosophers have attempted to ground human rights on the requirement of human
agency, on human dignity, or the preconditions for human flourishing, among others, each
of which may yield a different catalogue of rights. Political and legal theorists debate
whether human rights depend on the existence of the state, whether they impose
corresponding duties, and, if so, upon whom are those duties imposed.
41.
See James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International
Law of Peace 49-50 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 1963); Rudolf Bystricky, The Universality
of Human Rights in a World of ConflictingIdeologies, in International Protection of Human
Rights 83 (Asbjorn Eide & August Schou eds., 1968).
42.
See Richard Brandt, The Theory of the Good and the Right (1979) (offering
utilitarian analysis of human rights); Richard M. Hare, Justice and Equality, in Justice and
Economic Distribution 116, 130 (John Arther & William H. Shaw eds., 1978) (defining the
critical question as "[w]hat principles of justice, what attitudes towards the distribution of
goods, what ascriptions of rights, are such that their acceptance is in the general interest?").
43.
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); John Rawls, Political Liberalism
(1993); John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in On Human Rights: The Oxford Anmesty
Lectures 41 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993) (applying constructivist view of
justice as fairness to derive universally applicable human rights principles).
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law." In popular discourse, however, human rights are frequently regarded
as independent of social contract or positive law.45
Human rights are rights we all enjoy, whether or not they find recognition
in positive law or provide for individual remedy.4"
This pre-political or politically transcendent quality of human rights
represents an important distinction between human rights discourse and
rights discourse generally. Whereas rights exercised within a narrower
juridical context operate as internal constraints on state power, enforced
through legal claims of the governed, human rights discourse operates as an
external constraint on state power, brought to bear as much by domestic and
international political pressure as by formal procedural enforcement of
positive law. Articulated on this level, human rights discourse is often
abstract and aspirational rather than concrete and justiciable. Although these
qualities represent limitations in a legal context, perhaps even exacerbating
the problem of indeterminacy, they permit human rights discourse to operate
44.
See Hedley Bull, The Universality ofHuman Rights, 8 Millennium: J. Int'l Stud.
155, 159 (1979) ("The validity of our beliefs about human rights does not depend on the
amount of consensus that exists in favor of them ...").
45.
The Universal Declaration clearly embraces this idea. The Declaration states:
The General Assembly [p]roclaims this Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society..
. shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms and by progressive measure, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and
observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Universal Declaration, supra note 1,preamble.
46.
Joy Gordon suggests that
[t]he Enlightenment conception of rights does not fit cleanly within the
framework of either natural law or positive law. It holds that, in
contradistinction to positive legal entitlements, there exist legal rights
inherent in the individual, prior to and outside of the state and society.
..[I]n contrast to natural law, [this] conception of rights very much

anticipates enforcement in concrete ways [including] revolutions and
political institutions.
Joy Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: The History and Meaningof its Politicization,

23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 689, 757 (1998).
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politically as a standard against which state practice can be measured and
around which popular mobilization can occur.
This distinction evident in the discourse of human rights is mirrored
in the system of positive law in which those human rights are embodied.
Although international legal instruments often speak of rights as direct and
unconditional entitlements of human beings, they do not generally create
obligations that run directly between the individual and the state.' Rather,
international human rights instruments create obligations among states
regarding their treatment of their own citizens." Professor Louis Henkin has
described individuals as the "third-party beneficiaries" of these contracts
among states.'9 Individual rights under international human rights law
therefore depend upon the political will of states to insist that these
obligations are met. Thus, in both human rights discourse and positive law,
there is a disjunction between state obligation and individual rights claims.
These features of international human rights discourse have
significant implications for both the radical and communitarian critiques of
rights talk. For example, Glendon's argument that rights encourage the
individual to indulge his own interests against the common good responds
primarily to the power of rights to trump collective goals.50 The success of
human rights claims in the face of state practices that violate international
norms, however, will very often depend upon domestic and international
political support. In this sense, the claim of right does not trump collective
goals but rather serves as a catalyst for collective expression of shared
values. Moreover, despite arguments such as Tushnet's that individual rights
undermine political mobilization, the quest for human rights has served
repeatedly as a rallying point for liberatory movements around the world and
as a basis for transnational organization."' Finally, the gap between human
rights discourse and positive law, coupled with the abstract and aspirational
nature of that discourse may contribute to political change in a way that
forestalls the conservative force of rights criticized by feminists and critical
race theorists.
47.
48.
49.

For a concise discussion of this point, see Henkin, supra note 7, at 268.
Id. at 268- 69.
Id. at 270.

50.
51.

See Glendon, supra note 4, at 109-12.
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36 Colum. J.

Transnat'l L. 41, 52 (1997) (arguing that "retreat of the all-controlling state and... [the]
emergence of the morally autonomous individual, far from undermining community and
civic virtue, creates the necessary conditions for real community and genuine civic virtues").
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III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
If the period since the drafting of the Universal Declaration can be
called the "Age of Rights," the latter part of that period might also be called
the "Age of Difference," as it has been characterized by the emergence of a
wide range of identity-based political movements. 2 Among these, the most
familiar to Americans, perhaps, are movements such as feminism and gay
rights, defined according to shared characteristics politicized by societal
discrimination. Elsewhere, ethnic nationalism has re-emerged with groups
claiming linguistic and/or genealogical kinship and revitalizing historical
conflicts.53 Throughout the world indigenous groups have mobilized
politically to assert rights to land, culture, and sovereignty.54 Finally,
fundamentalist religious movements here and abroad increasingly insist on
the right to pursue traditional practices and structures of government at odds
with international norms." Each of these movements makes a claim of
political solidarity and community based on shared history, culture, belief
system, or other characteristics that are particular, not general--or at least
less than universal.
The emergence of identity politics in its various forms presents at
least two important theoretical challenges to the accepted framework of
international human rights, both of which concern the role and nature of the
52.

According to Cornel West:
Distinctive features of the new cultural politics of difference are to trash

the monolithic and homogeneous in the name of diversity, multiplicity
and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general and universal in light
of the concrete, specific and particular; and to historicize, contextualize
and pluralize by highlighting the contingent, provisional, variable,
tentative, shifting and changing.
Comel West, Keeping Faith, Philosophy and Race in America 3 (1993).
53.

See Elizabeth Kiss, Is Nationalism Compatiblewith Human Rights? Reflections

on East-CentralEurope, in Identities, Politics, and Rights 367 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1997) (discussing the rise of nationalism and arguing that it has no necessary
relationship to the enforcement of human rights).
54.
For overviews of this development, see S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in
International Law (1996); Chris Tenant, IndigenousPeoples,InternationalInstitutions, and
the InternationalLegal Literaturefrom 1945-1993, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. I (1994).
55.
The Islamic fundamentalism movement, Taliban, in Afghanistan is an apt example

in this context. This movement, now controlling most of the country, has imposed harsh
restrictions on women and girls. See, e.g., Associated Press, 100 Girls Schools in Afghan
CapitalAre OrderedShut, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1998, at A8.
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individual in human rights theory. First, the emphasis on identity-based
differences not only prioritizes difference over commonality but also-and
perhaps more importantly-reflects a particular assumption about identity
formation. In liberal theory, difference is a product of the choices of
autonomous, self-determining subjects expressing their particular visions of
the good. The exercise of individual choice produces differences in cultural
practices, artistic and political expression, and religion, among others.57 A
strong commitment to pluralism, in turn, protects those choices. Human
rights instruments reflect these liberal assumptions about individual choice
and difference in their protection of freedom of speech, association, and
religion."
In contrast, feminist, anti-racist, and postcolonial theorists tend to
view difference as a product of power, location, culture, and history.59
Differences are regulatory, socially-constructed, and constitutive of identity,
not manifestations of the free choices of liberal subjects. This notion that
differences are constitutive of identity rather than a self-determined
expression of identity undermines the liberal assumption that a common
humanity existing prior to difference will yield consensus regarding political
first principles. Moreover, it suggests that our traditional framework of
negative liberties, premised on protecting individual choice and disregarding
the constraints identity imposes on the subject, afford a somewhat limited
form of freedom.'
The second important theoretical challenge presented by identity
politics concerns the relationship between the individual and the community.
Conceptually, human rights discourse invites us to see ourselves as
essentially human, as human beings first. It asserts a collective identity that
encompasses the human species as a whole while at the same time treating
56.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 36 (1993) (arguing that "[u]nder the political and
social conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of
conflicting and irreconcilable-and what's more, reasonable-comprehensive doctrines will
come about and persist if such diversity does not already obtain").
57.
Nancy L. Rosenblum, Pluralismand Self-Defense, in Liberalism and the Moral
Life, 220, 220-21 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (discussing the relationship between
pluralism and liberalism).
58.
See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18.
59.
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity 2 (1990)
(arguing that "the feminist subject turns out to be produced by the very political system that
is supposed to facilitate its emancipation"); West, supra note 52, at 267-70 (articulating a
genealogical materialist account of race).
60.
For an elaboration of this argument in the context of constitutional theory, see
Higgins, supra note 6, at 1694-99.
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the individual as the relevant political unit. In contrast, the politics of
difference, in its various forms, emphasizes the differences among groups or
cultures while stressing the commonality among individuals within those
groups. At best, this group-based identity fits uncomfortably within the
liberal human rights framework both because it deems relevant differences
from which rights discourse abstracts and because it ignores intra-group
differences that rights discourse privileges. Arguments that emphasize the
inadequacy of the international human rights framework to protect equally
the interests of individuals divided by race, gender, ethnicity, and religion
rely on the difference rationale. In contrast, arguments that rely upon
identity-based claims to religious or cultural practices rely on collective
values that downplay or deny individual autonomy and, in effect, individual
difference.
The assumptions about identity and community that drive identity
politics pose a fundamental question: Can any one set of civil, political, and
social rights (much less the prevailing one) accommodate the multiplicity of
legitimate claims that stems from politicized group identities? If the answer
is no, as some have suggested,6' human rights discourse loses much of its
vitality as a medium for political exchange and mobilization. By shifting the
focus of the multicultural debate from an emphasis on "human" to an
emphasis on "rights," the next section suggests a way to maintain some of
that vitality while taking seriously the challenges of identity politics.

61.
See, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-ColonialFeminism andthe Veil: Consideringthe
Differences, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1527 (1992) (criticizing Western feminist assumptions
regarding the significance of the veil in Muslim societies); Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant
Perception, World Travelling, and MulticulturalFeminism: The Case of Female Genital
Surgeries, 23 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 189 (1992) (criticizing the unreflective
condemnation by Western feminists of female genital surgeries and urging a more culturally
sensitive approach); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreword: Symposium on East Asian
Approaches to Human Rights, 2 Buff. J. Int'l L. 193 (1995-96) (describing East Asian
consensus that human rights must be culturally determined); cf Dianne Otto, Rethinking the
UniversalityofHuman Rights Law, 29 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (1997) (responding to
the claim of imperialism and suggesting strategies for ameliorating the risks associated with
exporting Western ideals to non-Western states).
This debate informed the drafting of the Universal Declaration itself. For example,
Arab states challenged the right to change religion, a standard contrary to the tenets of Islam.
Howard Tolley, The U.N. Commission on Human Rights 1, 22 (1987). The Soviets were
opposed to the preponderance of Western civil liberties. Id. at 21. Western nations were
persuaded to include economic, social, and cultural rights in the document only after having
been assured that it would not be legally binding. Id. at 21-22.
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IV. RIGHTS DISCOURSE AS A COMMON LANGUAGE

Viewed through the lens of identity politics, the category human is
refracted into a vast array of overlapping sub-categories, each of which poses
a separate challenge to the notion of a common humanity. When this
multicultural array is viewed through the lens of human rights discourse,
however, a different, more manageable set of categories emerges. Organized
according to the minority's stance toward the majority-defined rights regime,
the complaints raised by cultural, ethnic, or other minorities that drive the
politics of difference generally fall into three categories. First, such groups
may complain that they are inappropriately defined as different, narrow, or
exceptional while the culture and characteristics of the majority are accepted
as neutral, universal, or at least representative of the general interest. 2
Second, minorities may complain that their distinctiveness is inappropriately
ignored or disrespected by the majority, that they are denied the opportunity
to assert their distinct status in the political and economic realms or to
organize their communities around that distinct status.63 Third, minorities
may not merely insist on the right to dissent and to self-determination but
propound an alternative universalist vision that challenges the foundational
commitments of the majority."
The first type of challenge, a claim of unjust marginalization, might
be understood as a response to the failure of the existing human rights
regime to realize its own commitments. For example, Article 2 of the
Universal Declaration guarantees the rights and freedom set forth "without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion," etc65
This equality guarantee, however, has not proven to be very robust. It has
been most effective, at least rhetorically, as a form of negative liberty,
guaranteeing freedom from state-sponsored discrimination. It has been much
62.
For example, feminists have challenged the fairness of workplace standards that
implicitly assume a male worker, or one that is not the primary caretaker of young children.
See Mary E. Becker, PrinceCharming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 202-12;
Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279, 1279-1337
(1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L. J.
1281, 1281-1328 (1991).
63.
An example would be Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where Amish
parents claimed the right to remove their children from public education once the children
graduated from eighth grade.
64.
See Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue a UniversalClaim, Remarks, N.Y.B.A. Panel
on the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 11, 1998. See
infra page 305 for copy of manuscript.
65.
Universal Declaration, supra note I, art. 2.
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more problematic with respect to the realization of positive rights such as
education, employment, and an adequate standard of living. Not only have
states failed to realize these rights generally, the failure has often mapped the
very categories listed in the equality guarantee.' As a result, the very
guarantee of nondiscrimination in the protection of rights gives rise to
identity-based political affiliations by appearing to promise but failing to
deliver equality. 7 Precisely because members of ethnic or racial minorities
are denied the substantive equality promised by human rights instruments,
such groups mobilize along the lines of division." This mobilization, in turn,
undercuts the premise of commonality underlying the equal protection
guarantee.
Much feminist human rights activism on the international level is an
example of this form of identity politics. The international feminist
movement did not emerge out of any pre-existing or essential connection
among women as women.69 Rather, it is a direct response to the failure of the
traditional human rights framework to safeguard women's fundamental
integrity. To the extent that international alliances exist, women's shared
experiences of oppression have helped to create them across nations and
cultures with radically divergent beliefs.7"
In this context, feminists have exposed problems in the existing
human rights framework that contribute to the systematic subordination of
women and have argued that gender difference must be taken into account
in reformulating human rights norms-not as an exception to those norms
but as a constituent part of them. Though expressed in reformist terms, such
arguments are potentially quite radical in their impact on our human rights
regime. One need only recall the recent resistance to the inclusion of gender

66.
See, e.g., The World's Women: 1995 Trends and Statistics 90 (United Nations
1995) (documenting a lower literacy rate for women than for men in almost every region of
the world); id. at 108-9 (documenting women's disproportionate share of unpaid work in
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal and worldwide under-representation in the paid labor market).
67.
For a discussion of the connection between liberal citizenship and identity politics,
see Brown, supra note 18, at 96-134.
68.
Id.
69.
See Higgins, supra note 5, at 89-90 (describing the widespread divisions and
conflicts among state representatives and women's rights activists at the U.N. World
Conference on Women in Beijing).
70.
See id. (noting the emergence of coalitions, particularly in connection with the
issue of violence against women).

1999]

REGARDING RIGHTS

as a basis for political asylum under U.S. law to see why. 7 Opponents
argued that adjusting our notion of international human rights abuses to
include not just what states do to their own citizens but also states'
systematic failure to protect some of its citizens from the abuse of others
would "dilute the power of core human rights protections." Supporters
insisted that the move would create much-needed enforceable obligations on
the part of states to provide affirmative protections.
Despite their potentially radical impact, these arguments are internal
to our human rights framework in that they accept the aspirations of the
existing scheme at a general level but argue that those aspirations have been
improperly defined in some cases and inadequately met in others. For
example, most Western feminist theorists working on international human
rights accept the assumption that individuals are rights-bearers72 and that
those rights should be universally respected." To the extent that feminists
reject assumptions regarding universal personhood, that rejection is usually
based upon the claim that personhood has been defined largely in male
terms.7 4 The response to this critique, therefore, involves an expansion of our
notion of personhood to embrace more fully the experiences of women,
particularly with respect to the impact of private power and violence. In
other words, these feminist critics are engaged in an effort to recast basic
rights to address more fully the needs of women.
71.

See Anjana Bahl, Home is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and Gender-Based

Claims of Persecution, 4 Cardozo Women's L.J. 33 (1997) (discussing arguments in
opposition to expansion of asylum).
72.
This assumption is often simply taken for granted, not stated explicitly. Evidence
of the importance of the individual as rights-bearer can be found in feminist skepticism
toward group rights rooted in culture. See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Cultural
Particularismas a Bar to Women's Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience,

in Women's Rights/Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, supra note 33, at
176-88. For a discussion of the problems created by feminism's simultaneous commitment

to a critique of rights and liberal individualism and to the expansion of women's rights
globally, see Higgins, supra note 5.
73.
Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of
Human Rights, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 486, 492 (1990) (advocating an expansion of state

obligations "to respond to the brutal and systematic violation of women globally); Hilary
Charlesworth, et al., supranote 33, at 621 (acknowledging cultural difference but advocating

an "international feminist perspective" that would inform international law).
74.
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in On
Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, 83-109 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993). MacKinnon notes that "[h]uman rights principles are based on experience, but not

that of women," and then goes on to suggest ways to remedy this deficit. Id. at 84.
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Though in some sense radical, such internal challenges should not
be seen as threats to the human rights framework but rather opportunities to
see it in a new light. Consider the Universal Declaration, a document which
lays out a traditional human rights agenda inspired by Western liberalism
and therefore presumably vulnerable to the feminist critique I have
described. Article I obliges all human beings, not merely states, to act
toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Article 3 declares that
everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.76 Again, the
language includes no mention of the state." In light of the feminist critique,
this guarantee can plausibly be read both as a constraint on state-sponsored
deprivations of these rights and an obligation of the state to prevent
deprivations by non-state actors.78 Similarly, Article 23, guaranteeing rights
in the workplace, must logically refer to obligations on private employers.79
In short, the plain language of the Universal Declaration goes well beyond
the actions of states to confer duties on non-state organizations and upon
individuals." Read in this way, it addresses many of the substantive
concerns raised by feminists regarding the abuse of private power.
The second category of challenges presented by the politics of
difference includes multiculturalist arguments for the preservation of cultural
values through separation or exclusion. Such claims are really arguments for
the majority to respect, or at least tolerate, 8' the practices, customs, religious
beliefs, or social organization of the minority by declining to enforce the
norms of the majority. In the face of such challenges, one must ask the
difficult question as to what extent a human rights regime committed at least
75.

Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 1.

76.

Id. art. 3.

77.

For a discussion of the creation of private duties under international human rights

law, see Jordan J. Paust, The OtherSide of Right: PrivateDuties Under Human Rights Law,

5 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 51, 53 (1992) (noting that "[m]ost of the articles in the Declaration
speak generally of the particular rights and freedoms of each person or of everyone without
any mention of which person or entity might owe a corresponding duty").
78.

See id. at 53-54.

79.
Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 23.
80.
See Lung-Chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law 215
(1989) (noting that "most [human rights standards] are documented in terms of the right of
persons and not in terms of participation in or protection from the state. They are, in the
words of the International Court of Justice, obligatio erga omnes (owing by and to all
humankind)").
81.
For a discussion of the distinction between toleration and respect in the context
of human rights, see Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in
Ethnicity and Group Rights 69-104 (1997).
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in part to toleration and pluralism must accept the intolerant subcommunity. 2
A common response to this type of conflict is to interrogate the
legitimacy of the claims of a cultural or religious groups by asking who is
asserting them and who might be resisting. Rather than responding to the
claim directly, defenders of universalism may instead question who is
entitled to speak on behalf of the dissenting sub-community and whether the
cultural defense is being asserted in good faith. 3 This response, though
sometimes valid, often misses the point. Certainly culture and religion are
sometimes invoked cynically to mask oppression." But, if one assumes the
strongest case for cultural claims-that they are asserted in good faith and
represent consensus among those affected by the practice-this second
category of culture-based challenges presents a more difficult problem for
the international human rights community than does the first. Unlike
minority groups seeking transformation through inclusion, those raising this
second type of challenge do not seem to embrace the basic commitments of
the majority. Rather, they merely want out, exemption, exclusion, a remedy
that appears to be inconsistent with the commitment to the universality of
basic rights.
The United States Supreme Court faced (and ultimately avoided)
this issue in Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez, 5 a case involving the power
of a Native American tribe to determine the requirements for tribal
membership. Under the tribe's rules, the children of a male member of the
tribe and a female who was not a member of the tribe could obtain tribal
82.
For a discussion of the obligations of a liberal regime to tolerate a community that
may reject liberal values, see Chandran Kukathas, CulturalToleration, in Ethnicity and
Group Rights, supra note 81, at 120-21.
83.
See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 72, at 176 (citing examples of the use of cultural or
religious defenses by Islamic regimes accused of suppressing feminist dissent).
84.

Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights

Discourse, in Women's Rights/Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives, supra
note 33, at 167, 169 ("No social group has suffered greater violation of its human rights in
the name of culture than women. Regardless of the particular forms it takes in different
societies, the concept of culture in the modem state circumscribes women's lives in deeply
symbolic as well as immediately real ways.").
As a specific example, Rao cites Kenyatta's invocation of culture as a defense to
the practice of female genital surgery among Kikuyu. Rao urges the questioning of the
"politics of such a claim, particularly when it is made by a male national leader on behalf of
the social group most directly affected by the practice: women." Id.
85.
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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membership." In contrast, if the mother but not the father was a member of
the tribe, the children were excluded from membership. 7 A woman seeking
membership for her children challenged this gender-based inequality under
a federal statute, the Indian Civil Rights Act, which made individual civil
rights protections under federal law applicable to members of Native
American tribes."8 The question facing the Supreme Court seemed to present
a conflict between the prerogatives of the tribe to define its membership and
the rights of individuals within the group to the civil liberties guaranteed by
the laws of the outsider/majority. 9 The Court declined to address the
question directly, finding no individual right to sue under the statute. 9 The
effect of the decision, however, was to uphold the prerogative of the tribe on
the issue of tribal membership.
On the international level, a similar conflict arises when groups
invoke religious or cultural justifications for the practice of polygamy or
female genital surgery or the maintenance of strict rules of purdah. Again,
one can analyze these situations as a direct conflict between local practices
and international norms, placing female genital surgery, polygamy, or purdah
in a category with ethnic cleansing or torture. Nevertheless, the reason that
human rights advocates and even feminists have difficulty responding to
such challenges is that the defenders of such cultural practices tend to invoke
justifications human rights advocates are obliged to respect, including
autonomy, cultural integrity, and religious freedom.9
Again, consider the Universal Declaration. Articles 18 and 19
guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, and the freedom, either alone
or in the company of others and in public or private, to manifest one's
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.92 To what
extent can the right of religious observance or political self-determination
legitimately be invoked to deny other rights such as the right to be free from
86.
Id. at 52-53.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 53.
89.
For a discussion of the Santa Clara Pueblo case in the context of feminist theory,
see MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 63-69 (1988) (calling into question the cultural claim
asserted by the tribal community), and Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 593-94 (1990) (criticizing MacKinnon's assumption
that the Pueblo women's gender identity is more important than their tribal identity).
90.
The Court held both that the tribe itself was protected by sovereign immunity and
that no private right of action existed. 436 U.S. at 59, 64-65.
91.
For an example of an argument that takes seriously such contentions in a crosscultural critique, see Gunning, supra note 61.
92.
Universal Declaration, supra note 1, arts. 18, 19.
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gender discrimination? On one hand, one might view the dissenting member
of the community as the relevant rights-bearer whose claim must be
recognized against the power of the community. Yet it is such a view that is
most vulnerable to the critique that rights discourse promotes selfish
individualism and disregard of collective interests. 93 Focusing on the
individual alone obscures the significance of the intermediate unit between
the citizen and the state. On the other hand, one might as easily view the
minority community as the rights-bearer against the power of the majority
that insists on an egalitarian norm. 9' Unless the human rights framework can
accommodate such group-based claims ofright, at least some very important
interests will fall outside of its protection.95
The conflict among the claims of the majority, minority
subcommunities, and individual members of those communities is a problem
that admits no easy resolution. Nevertheless, although it often arises from the
assertion of group identity, it is not a problem that can be attributed to
cultural difference per se. Rather, it goes to the tensions that are built into
our foundational human rights documents, particularly with respect to the
status of group rights.' In other words, the problem resides not in the
conflict over the category human but the contestation over the meaning and
content of rights.
This distinction is more than semantic in that the invocation of the
language of rights by groups engaged in practices the human rights
community finds objectionable brings such groups into a common discourse.
For example, in the Santa Clara Pueblo case, both the tribe and the plaintiff
mother were arguing from within the same rights-based paradigm.
Resolution of their conflicting rights claims, to sovereignty and to gender
equality, did not entail rejection of that paradigm but rather invited a
working out of competing arguments articulated in a common language. By
making rights-based arguments, the defenders of cultural practices submit
themselves, at least rhetorically, to the dominant community and its legal
93.
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing communitarian
critique).
94.
For an example of an argument strongly supporting this view with respect to the
intolerant sub community, see Kukathas, supra note 82.
95.
Many strong defenders of liberalism have begun to take seriously collective
interests and have attempted to accommodate those interests within a liberal framework. See,
e.g., Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (1995) (articulating a liberal theory of
minority rights).
96.
See id. at 34-48 (discussing the difficulties and possibilities of recognizing group
rights within a liberal framework).
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structures. The rhetoric signals a desire not so much to be left alone but to
be embraced, respected by the rights-regarding community.
Finally, the third category of challenges presented by the politics of
difference can be defined by the absence of shared assumptions and the
rejection of the human rights discourse altogether. In this category, the
community of human rights dissenters responds to criticism by insisting on
the irrelevance of such standards. Such an argument does not depend upon
the assertion of cultural difference-cultural difference is properly a defense
within the rights framework. Rather, the dissenting community may offer an
alternative vision that simply does not speak to the agenda of the majority.
Moreover, as Jeremy Waldron points out, this vision may be a competing
universal claim, not one of many acceptable views within a pluralist
international community. 7
For example, in response to the U.N. Population Conference in
Cairo in 1994 and again to the U.N. World Conference on Women in
Beijing in 1995, the Catholic Church and representatives of several Muslim
countries denounced the agenda of both as promoting immorality by
advocating family planning and emphasizing sexual autonomy." Though at
times articulated in the language of cultural difference," these objections in
fact represented competing universalist claims. Neither the Vatican nor
Muslim leaders were claiming merely a right to dissent. Rather, they offered
an alternative vision of universal norms regarding sexuality, reproduction,
the family, and ultimately the status of women in society.
Objections that fall within this third category resist accommodation
within a liberal-pluralist regime based on a combination of individual and
group rights. Unlike the rights-based claims of dissenting groups, such
conflicting universalist claims do not depend upon an implicit acceptance of
the traditional human rights framework. By challenging the moral
foundations of that framework, this third category demarcates the limits of
the rights discourse and represents the most serious challenge to the
principles of the Universal Declaration.
97.
See Jeremy Waldron, supra note 64.
98.
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Vatican Rejects Compromise on Abortion at U.N. Meeting,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1994, at Al, A8 (quoting an Islamic newspaper describing the
conference as "hailing promiscuity, calling for abortion and extramarital sex, and pointing
to an era with no morals, where all values are trampled underfoot"); Barbara Crossette,
Vatican DropsFightAgainst UN. PopulationDocument,N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1994, at A5.
99.
See Barbara Crossette, The Second Sex in the Third World, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10,
1995, at A25 (describing Western conservative groups, including the Vatican, as invoking
the charge of cultural imperialism).
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V. CONCLUSION

Viewing cultural difference or identity politics as a threat to human
rights standards reflects the notion that a shared idea of what it means to be
human is essential to the acceptance of those standards. I have argued,
however, that our human rights regime is able to endure in the face of
divergent ideas of human flourishing so long as a common discourse of
rights is available at a general level. Indeed, the very effort to accommodate
such competing conceptions within rights discourse may address some of the
acknowledged limitations of that discourse. Although certain groups will
continue to stand outside the existing framework and challenge its terms, it
is acceptance of the language of rights, not recognition of cultural difference
that is the relevant marker.

